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Bowdoin: Easements: Judicial and Legislative Protection of the Public's Ri

COMMENTARY
EASEMENTS: JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC'S RIGHTS IN FLORIDA'S
BEACHES*
An ever increasing public use of coastal beach property1 has resulted in
private property owners restricting their beaches for their exclusive use. This
exclusion problem in coastal states is leading to a reevaluation of the private
owner's property rights.2 Court decisions in these states indicate that beach
property is regarded as having a unique quality that requires different treatment from inland property.3 The proposed Open Beaches Act of 19694 ex5
pressed this view:
[Tihe sea beaches of the United States are of such a character as to
use and potential development as to require separate consideration
from other lands with respect to the elements and consequences of
title in littoral owners. Such land has been treated by and large over
most of the time that it has been controlled by European and AngloAmerican law, as a common. It has been of little use for farming,
grazing, timber production, mining, or residency-the traditional uses
of land-but has served as a thoroughfare and haven for fishermen and
sea venturers and a place of recreation for the citizenry. The elements
and consequences of title in littoral owners are thus colored by these
traditional uses.
Recognizing public sentiment toward the problem, courts of coastal states
are protecting the interests and rights of the public through the use of easement theories. Behind a shield of public policy these courts have made use
of three common law doctrines to establish public easements in private
beaches: prescription, 6 implied dedication, 7 and custom.8 Although as yet
OEDITOR'S NoTE: This commentary received the University of FloridaLaw Review Alumni
Association Commentary Award as the outstanding commentary submitted during the fall
1972 quarter.
1. In this commentary the terms "beach property" and "beaches" refer to the soft-sand
area between the mean high-water mark, the boundary of private ownership in Florida,
and the extreme high-water mark or vegetation line. For a complete discussion of Florida
law and definitions of riparian boundaries see Gay, The High Water Mark: Boundary
Between Public and Private Lands, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 553 (1966).
2. See Note, Implied Dedication in California: A Need for Legislative Reform, 7
CALIF. W.L. REv. 259 (1970); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. RFv. 564 (1969).
3. This reaction has taken the form of a new public policy, as exemplified by judicial
decisions of various coastal state courts. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465
P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968); State
ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
4. H.R. 6656, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
5. Id. §101.
6. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
7. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P'.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
8. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
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unused,9 legislative action is a fourth possibility. This commentary will
evaluate these four methods of establishing public easements and will propose
judicial and legislative solutions to Florida's beach property problem.
JUDICLkL SOLUTIONS

Florida's Choice: Prescription
Prescription means literally "before written," and the common law theory
was that where a use was long continued, it was presumed to be based on a
lost grant.10 The later common law courts set the period of twenty years as
the length of use necessary for the presumption to arise.1 ' Florida applied
the common law view'- until 1958 when the Florida supreme court abandoned the lost grant theory in Downing v. Bird.3 In Downing the court
summarized the requirements of prescription. In addition to the twenty-year
use requirement the court stated:- 4
[Tihe right is acquired only by actual, continuous, uninterrupted use
by the claimant of the lands of another, for a prescribed period. In
addition the use must be adverse under claim of right and must either
be with the knowledge of the owner or so open, notorious, and visible
that knowledge of the use by and adverse claim of the claimant is imputed to the owner.... ETihe use.., must be inconsistent with the
owner's use and enjoyment of his lands and must not be a permissive
use, for the use must be such that the owner has a right to a legal
action to stop it, such as an action for trespass or ejectment.
In the most recent Florida case dealing with prescriptive easements
in beach property, 5 City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc.,1 the court
9.

See text accompanying notes 68-69 infra. Oregon and Texas have passed beach

bills, but they apply to already existing easements and do not establish new easements. See
ORE. Rxv. STAT. §390.610 (1967); TEx. RaV. Civ. STAT. art 5415d (1962).
10. J. CRMBTrr, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW oF PROPERTY 271 (1962).
11. 1 R. BOYER, FLORmA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §23.03, at 531-82 (1972). Originally,
the courts required proof that the right or usage had been enjoyed into time past the
memory of man. In England this came to mean proof of enjoyment dating back to the
time of Richard I. Due to obvious difficulties involved in proving such long duration,
however, the custom arose of allowing a presumption of a lost or prior grant upon proof
of usage for a term of years. Id. at 529.
12. See, e.g., Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, 89 Fla. 253, 103 So. 625 (1925).
13. 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958). Recognizing that the fiction of the prior grant had lost
favor in the law, the Florida supreme court stated: "The trend . . . is to abandon the
theory that prescriptive rights are based on the presumption of a prior grant, and to
treat the acquisition thereof as being rights acquired by methods substantially similar to
those by which title is acquired by adverse possession." Id. at 64.
14. Id. at 64. For a detailed discussion of the various elements of prescription see 1

R. Boym, supra note 11, at 535.
15. Several earlier Florida cases recognized the application of prescriptive easements in
beach property. E.g., City of Miami Beach v. Undercliff Realty & Inv. Co., 155 Fla. 805,
21 So. 2d 783 (1945); City of Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 153 Fla. 107,
14 So. 2d 172 (1948).
16. 271 So. 2d 765 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1972).
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applied the Downing requirements and found an easement accruing to the
public through use of the property in question. The City of Daytona Beach
had granted a building permit to an amusement corporation authorizing
it to construct an observation tower on the corporation's beach property.
Before construction, local citizens brought an action challenging the city's
right to grant the building permit due to the public nature of the corporation's property. The trial court found a prescriptive easement in the
property in favor of the public and held the city was without authority to
grant the building permit. The amusement corporation was enjoined to
remove the skytower, which had been constructed during the pendency of
17
the litigation.
The undisputed facts on appeal were that the general public had visited
the beach property for more than twenty years and had continuously and
uninterruptedly "used and enjoyed the soft sand area of the beach involved
I.. as a thoroughfare, for sunbathing, picnicking, frolicking, running of dune
buggies, parking, and generally as a recreation area and playground." 18 The
disputed issue was whether the public's use was "open, notorious, visible,
and adverse under an apparent claim of right and without material challenge
or interference by anyone purporting to be the owner of the land."' 9 The
amusement corporation claimed that the public's use was neither inconsistent
nor adverse, since the property was used to support a recreational pier extending out over the property into the ocean. Furthermore, the company claimed
that by occasionally washing down the pier and replacing piling it exercised
authority of ownership by requiring the public to move back from the pier
to a safe distance3 0 Affirming the trial court, the First District Court of
Appeal held that the Downing requirements had been met by the public
and a prescriptive easement had arisen3 The sporadic exercise of authority
by the property owners was held insufficient to preserve their rights against
the prescriptive rights of the public.
In beach property cases Florida courts have departed from a long-standing
judicial attitude that strongly disfavored prescription. 22 Even so, when considering the doctrine of prescription as a judicial method for protecting the
public's interests in Florida's beaches, two inadequacies necessitate a search
for more expedient solutions. First, there is the obvious problem that arises
from the difficulty in meeting the Downing requirements 23 and establishing
factual evidence of twenty years adverse use. 24 Establishing public easements
through prescription requires a specialized type of use: 25
17. Id. at 767.
18.

Id. at 766.

19. Id.
20.
21.
22.
favored

Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
"Acquisition of rights by one in the lands of another, based on . . . use, is not
in the law and the acquisition of such rights will be restricted." Downing v. Bird,

100 So. 2d 57, 65 (Fla. 1958).
23. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
24. See, e.g., Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, 89 Fla. 253, 103 So. 625 (1925); Hunt Land Holding
Co. v. Schramm, 121 So. 2d 697 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
25. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
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Not all [public] use of beaches or shorelines gives rise to a prescriptive easement. Neither occasional use by a large number of bathers
nor frequent or even constant use by a smaller number of bathers
gives rise to a prescriptive right in the public to use privately owned
beaches.
In addition, prescriptive easements, by their nature, can be utilized only
on a tract-by-tract basis. Thus, the court in Daytona Beach, on rehearing,
stressed the particularity of its decision as applying only to the property in
litigation and not to all Florida beaches.28 This piecemeal approach is too
time-consuming to be of assistance to the public.
Implied Dedication
Broadly defined an implied dedication

is:27

[O]ne arising, by operation of law, from the acts of the owner. It
may exist without any express grant, and need not be evidenced by
any writing, nor, indeed, by any form of words, oral or written. It is
not founded on a grant, nor does it necessarily presuppose one, but it
is founded on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Two California cases, which were joined for opinion, exemplify the use of
implied dedication as a method for protecting the public's interests in beach
property. In Gion v. City of Santa Cruz2S the plaintiff owned a strip of land
between the ocean and a city street. The land was unimproved and was used
primarily as a parking area by the public who proceeded to the water to
swim, fish, and picnic. Public use continued "without any significant objection by the fee owners" 29 for several years. One prior owner testified that he
posted signs reading "Private Property," but they were quickly torn down or
blown away.30 Since 1900 the city regularly maintained the land to prevent
erosion and render the area more suitable for parking.
In Gion's sister case, Dietz v. King,3' plaintiffs, as representatives of the
public, sought to enjoin the defendant landowner from blocking an unimproved road that connected a public highway with beach property. The
beach and the road, the only convenient access to the sea, were on property
owned by the defendant, but had been used by the public "for at least 100
years."3 2 Some of the owners of adjacent land had attempted to collect a toll
for use of the road, but such efforts were sporadic and ineffectual. Prior
owners of the land had not objected to public use. In both Gion and Dietz

26. Id.
27. Roundtree v. Hutchison, 57 Wash. 414, 416, 107 P. 345, 346 (1910), citing B.
ELToTr, Tim LAw oF ROADS AND Sr. rs 123 (2d ed. 1900).
28. 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
29. Id. at 34, 465 P.2d at 53, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 165.

ELUoTr

&W.

30.

Id.

31. Dietz v. King, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970).
32. Id. at 36, 465 P.2d at 54, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
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the court found an implied dedication of an easement for recreational purposes. Use by members of the public at large for five years or more, without
seeking or receiving permission and believing that they had a right to such
use was held to constitute an implied dedication. Simply stated, the court
required a showing that members of the public "used the land as they would
have used public land." 33
The use of the long-standing doctrine3 4 of implied dedication, upon which
the California decisions are based, appears to be more effective than prescription as a means of protecting the public's interest. The five-year requirement
for implied dedication as opposed to the twenty-year requirement for prescription is an obvious advantage. Nevertheless, implied dedication is not the
best method for solving Florida's problem. In addition to the problems of
establishing evidence and engaging in tract-by-tract litigation, other reasons
exist for not proposing implied dedication as the judicial solution to Florida's
problem.
First, implied dedication is inherently self-defeating. The key element of
the doctrine, the animus dedicandi,3- finds expression in either the words,
acts, or acquiescence of the landowner. A landowner can easily overcome the
implication by taking positive action to exclude the public from his land.
Thus, it seems likely that beach property owners will take the exclusionary
action necessary to preserve their property rights. Overreaction in this direction would frustrate the objective of acquiring rights for the public in beach
property.3 6
The strongest reason against proposing use of the doctrine is that implied
dedication is not judicially favored in Florida. Although earlier Florida cases
allowed easements to arise by implied dedication due to a landowner's
acquiescence in public use'3 7 later decisions have refused to recognize such
dedications. These cases have held that even extended use by the public,31
without the consent or objection of the owner of the land, does not show an
intention to dedicate.3 9
Custom: The Proposed Judicial Remedy
To solve Florida's problem of vanishing public beaches, the judicial
remedy must be such that it can apply uniformly to all of Florida's beaches
33. Id. at 39, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
34. The United States Supreme Court recognized implied dedication nearly 150 years
ago in Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 31 U.S. 498 (1832).
35. "The intention of donating or dedicating." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 114 (4th ed.
rev. 1968).
36. This is illustrated by one California landowner's reaction to the implied dedication
decision in his state. The landowner constructed a six-foot high chain link fence, topped
with barbed wire, along more than three miles of formerly open beach in southern
California. See Palos Verdes Peninsula News, Jan. 20, 1971, at I, col. 2.
37. Palmetto v. Katsch, 86 Fla. 506, 98 So. 352 (1923).
38. Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 153 Fla. 107, 14 So. 2d 172 (1943).
39. Miller v. Bay-to-Gulf, Inc., 141 Fla. 452, 193 So. 425 (1940).
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through one decision rather than necessitating tract-by-tract litigation. The
custom doctrine- 0 satisfies that requirement.
The law of custom developed in England where, by immemorial custom,
citizens of localities had the right to use private land.-' The acquisition of
a right through custom required that the custom "must have continued from
time immemorial, without interruption, and as a right; it must be certain
as to the place, and as to the persons; and it must be certain and reasonable
as to the subject matter or rights created." 42 In an early English case43 the
common law doctrine of custom was said to be "an agreement, which has
been evidenced by such repeated acts of assent on both sides from the earliest
44
times... that it has become the law of the particular place."
Only two states, Oregon45 and Hawaii, 46 have used the custom doctrine
to afford the public rights in beach property. In the Oregon case, State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay,47 the uniformity requirement appeared to be the main
reason for using the custom doctrine and rejecting the prescription doctrine.
48
The Oregon court stated:
[P]rescription applies only to the specific tract of land before the
court, and doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for years
with tract-by-tract litigation. An established custom, on the other hand,
can be proved with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front lands
from the northern to the southern border of the state ought to be
treated uniformly.
In Thornton, owners of a tourist facility on an Oregon beach attempted to
construct a fence from their inland property across the beach to the hightide line of the Pacific Ocean. The trial court held that the public had an
easement by prescription and issued an injunction prohibiting the owners

40. "Custom" has been defined as a "usage or practice of the people, which by common
adoption and acquiescence and by long and unvarying habit, has become compulsory, and
has acquired the force of a law with respect to the place or subject-matter to which it
relates." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 461 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
41. 3 H. TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §935, at 623 (3d ed. 1939). See also 1 W.
BLAcxsrozm, COMMENTARIES 75-*78.
42.

3 H. TIPFANY, supra note 41.

43. Tyson v. Smith, 112 Eng. Rep. 1265 (1838).
44. Id. at 1273.
45. See State ex rel.Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
46. See In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 814, 440 P.2d 76 (1968). The Hawaii court used the
custom doctrine to redefine ownership of land grants made "to the edge of the sea" and
held that such grants went only to the vegetation line or the extreme high-tide line. As
Florida has already defined her coastal boundaries, such a redefinition of ownership is
impossible. See Miller v. Bay-to-Gulf, Inc., 141 Fla. 452, 193 So. 425 (1940). Therefore, the
creation of easements must be Florida's objective. For that reason the Hawaii decision will
not be used for comparison in this commentary.
47. 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
48. Id. at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/7

6

Bowdoin:
Easements:
Judicial and
Legislative
the Public's Ri
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEWProtection of
[Vol. XXV
from building fences or other obstacles on their beach property. 49 On appeal
the Oregon supreme court affirmed but based the easement on custom. The
court set out seven requirements necessary to establish a custom:50 (1) the
use must be ancient,51 (2) it must be free from dispute, (3) it must be reasonable, (4) it must be exercised without interruption, (5) it must have visible
limits, (6) it must be obligatory in that it applies to all landowners, and (7)
it must not be repugnant to other customs or established law.
The public use of Florida's beaches easily satisfies the above requirements,
and the reasoning used by the court in Thornton is equally applicable in
2 5

Florida:

The dry-sand area ... has been enjoyed by the general public as a
recreational adjunct of the wet-sand or foreshore area since the beginning of the state's political history ....

Thus, from the time of the

earliest settlement to the present day, the general public has assumed
that the dry-sand area was a part of the public beach, and the public
has used the dry-sand area for picnics, gathering wood, building warming fires, and generally as a headquarters from which to supervise
children or to range out over the foreshore as the tides advance and
recede.
Clearly, the custom doctrine is the best judicial remedy to protect the public's
interests in Florida's beaches.
LEGISLATIVE REMEDY

Statutory Declaration
Unconstrained by precedent, the Florida Legislature is in a better position
than the judiciary to protect the public's interests through statutory redefinition of coastline property rights. Although the state of Florida has always
owned the beach53 below the mean high-water mark, any attempted declaration of state ownership in the beaches above that mark would violate the
constitutional prohibition against taking property without clue process of
law. 54 Statutory redefinitions must be aimed at property rights as opposed
to property ownership; thus, a statute declaring the beaches of the state of
Florida, from the mean high-water mark to the vegetation line 53 to be im-

49. Id. at 585, 462 P.2d at 672.
50. 254 Ore. at 595, 462 P.2d at 677 (1969).
51. This requirement, also referred to in custom definitions as use from time immemorial,
was construed by the Oregon court to be satisfied if the customary use went back as far
as the state's political history or statehood, which was only a little over a century.
52. 254 Ore. at 587, 462 P.2d at 673 (1964).
53. More properly, the state is said to hold this property in trust for the people of the
state. See Gay, supra note 1.
54. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, 271 So. 2d 765 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
55. The vegetation line has been defined as the extreme seaward boundary of natural
vegetation, which typically spreads continuously inland. It includes the line of vegetation on
the seaward side of dunes or mounds of sand typically formed along the line of highest wave
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pressed with an easement for public recreational use would accomplish the
objective. 5
The constitutionality of such a legislative redefinition is generally recognized. Justice Stewart has stated that a state is not precluded by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments from developing and administering substantial
changes in property law: 57
Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition that the law
of real property is, under our Constitution, left to the individual
States to develop and administer. And surely ... any ... State isfree
to make changes either legislative or judicial, in its general rules of
real property law, including the rules governing the property rights of
riparian owners.
Not only are property rights constitutionally redefinable but in recent
times such rights have in fact been frequently altered to protect the public
welfare. One authority in the field of property stated: "[P]roperty rights have
received more narrowing redefinitions in a relatively few years than any
prophet of fifty years ago could have believed possible."58 According to
authorities, the essential question in cases involving the redefinition of property rights is whether the claimed private right of the tide holder is consistent
with the public welfare. If it is not, then it is held to be no right at all and
redefinition is possible.5 9 Since notions of public welfare change, the permissible scope of activities of landowners must also change. The time has
come in Florida for the public welfare to be protected. A change is necessary.
A Statutory Proposal
The "Florida Open Beaches Act," proposed in its entirety in the Appendix
and hereafter presented by sections, is recommended as legislative protection
of the public's interests.

action. H.R. 16,772, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §301 (1970). Oregon defines it simply as the "sea-

ward edge of vegetation where the upland supports vegetation." State ex Yel. Thornton v.
Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 586, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969).

56. Although the scope of this commentary is limited to proposing a statute to declare
an easement in beach property, it must be recognized that further legislation would be
required to establish a method of paying landowners who would be divested of their
property rights. A legislatively declared easement is in the nature of a condemnation proceeding. Earlier proposed bills preferred this approach. See, e.g., H.R. 6656, S. 3044, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 11,016, H.R. 15,714, H.R. 16,268, H.R. 16,772, 91st Cong., 2d

Sess. (1970).
57. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
58.

Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 Hasrs

LJ.135, 147 (1963).
59. This is exemplified by the common law notion that a landowner's proprietary
interest in the airspace above his land extended to an unlimited height. That notion
had to be revised with the advent of airplanes and air travel. See W. PRossER, LAw or ToRs
70 (4th ed. 1971).
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The purpose of section 1 of the proposed statute is to define and declare
a public easement in Florida's beaches:60
(1). The beaches of the State of Florida, from the mean high-water mark
to the vegetation line are subject to an easement in all members of the
public such that no record title holder of such property shall exclude any
person from the use of said property or build or have constructed any
fences, structures, obstacles, or impediments inconsistent with the public's
use upon the property.
The proposed definition of beach property as extending from the mean highwater mark to the vegetation line, 61 should be sufficient to include all of the
sandy beach property useful to the public. The easement declared is broad
enough to deny landowners the right to exclude the public through the use
of "Private Property" and "No Trespassing" signs, and it further precludes
structures such as fences, houses, garages, piers, and beach cabanas that might
deny the public free and unrestricted exercise of its property rights. The
statute allows latitude for certain structures, however, if they are not "inconsistent with the public's use upon the property."6 2 For example, a boat ramp
or a pier might be consistent with public use and could therefore survive
the test.
Due to the retroactive effect of the redefinition of property rights, fairness
demands certain compromises. The statutory prohibition of structures built
on beach property makes an exception in section 2 for structures built or in
the process of being built before the enactment of the statute: 63
(2). Except that such structures that were built previous to (date of
enactment) and are of the nature of dwelling houses, not including any
walls, fences, docks, walkways, driveways, or boat ramps, and that are not
constructed for the purpose of excluding the public from use of said property shall not be considered as being inconsistent with public use.
This exception is limited only to dwelling houses that were not built with
the intent to exclude the public from beach property. Thus, it would prevent
a last minute building surge by landowners attempting to circumvent the
statute. The exception clarifies the legislative intent to except only dwelling
houses and not structures such as fences and walls regardless of the builder's
intent. However, structures outside of the dwelling house exception can
survive this section if able to pass the "inconsistency test" of section 1.64
A limitation on the exception for dwelling houses is drafted into the
statute so that the exception would not include dwelling houses built before
enactment of the statute that had been judicially declared to be in violation
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Appendix §1.
See note 55 supra.
Appendix §1.
Appendix §2.
Appendix §1.
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of some public easement or that were the subject of pending action at the
time of enactment concerning public property rights: 65
(5). This exception shall not apply if such dwelling houses have been
judicially declared inconsistent with public use in prior litigation or if
such property is the subject of pending litigation as of (date of enactment) concerning the property rights of the public in that property and
the litigation results in a finding of use inconsistent with public use.
Such a limitation prevents a landowner whose property was already the subject of litigation from using the statute to shield his property from legal
action. The limitation also makes it clear that any property already subject
to an easement by a judicial decree cannot escape that decree by use of the
statute.
Finally, the proposed statute provides an exception for structures built
by city and county governments in the exercise of police power. Bath houses
and lifeguard towers built in the exercise of such police power are dearly
for the public's welfare and are not inconsistent with the public's interest
in beach property: 6
(4). This easement in the public shall not exclude construction of
structures such as are built in the public interest as the product of the
proper exercise of any city or county government's police powers and such
as are not inconsistent with the easement in the public.
Although this proposed statute, if enacted, would be a significant departure from the present state of the law and would be the first of its kind in
the United States, 67 it is not a novel idea. The "Open Beaches Act of 1969"63
and five similar bilIso9 were introduced in the Ninety-first Congress. They
had one primary theme-to declare the beaches of the United States to be
impressed with a public easement and thereby halt private landowners from
excluding the public from beach property. Although none of these bills were
passed by Congress, they provide substantial evidence that the public demands
governmental protection of its interests in America's beaches. Florida, whose
history and economy are so closely related with its beaches, should be a leader
in recognizing and satisfying this public need.

65. Appendix §3.
66. Appendix §4.
67. Two states, Oregon and Texas, have enacted beach bills that merely declare it the
public policy of the states to protect the rights that the public has already legally acquired.
See Omx. rxv. STAT. §390.610 (1967); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 5415d (1962).
68. H.R. 6656, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). See text accompanying note 5 supra.
69. S. 3044, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
16,772, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).

(1969); H.R. 11,016, H.R. 15,714, H.R. 16,268, H.R.
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CONCLUSION

The unique quality and finite quantity of beach property in Florida
requires the redefinition of riparian landowner's property rights. While the
traditional distaste for judicial legislation renders legislative redefinition
preferable, Florida courts have the power to effectuate a satisfactory solution
to Florida's beach problem through use of the custom doctrine. Regardless
of which branch takes the initiative, effective protection of the public welfare
requires immediate action.
W.

RODERICK BOWDOIN

APPENDIX
PROPOSED LEGISLATION To VEST AN EASEMENT IN FLORIDA'S BEACHES IN THE PUBLIC

Florida Open Beaches Act:
(1). The beaches of the state of Florida, from the mean high-water mark to the
vegetation line are subject to an easement in all members of the public such that no
record title holder of such property shall exclude any person from the use of said
property or build or have constructed any fences, structures, obstacles, or impediments
inconsistent with the public's use upon the property.
(2) Except that such structures that were built previous to (date of enactment) and
are of the nature of dwelling houses, not including any walls, fences, docks, walkways,
driveways, or boat ramps, and that are not constructed for the purpose of excluding the
public from use of said property shall not be considered as being inconsistent with public
use.

(3). This exception shall not apply if such dwelling houses have been judicially declared inconsistent with public use in prior litigation or if such property is the subject
of pending litigation as of (date of enactment) concerning the property rights of the public
in that property and the litigation results in a finding of use inconsistent with public use.
(4). This easement in the public shall not exclude construction of structures such as
are built in the public interest as the product of the proper exercise of any city or county
government's police powers and such as are not inconsistent with the easement in the
public.
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